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
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

25 February 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman  
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - February 1983

1. Iran-Iraq: The Intelligence Community still believes that Iran will attempt to mount a major offensive at Amarah. The Iranians appear to be devising a new strategy before launching another major strike but the available information is not adequate to discern what that strategy might be. In any event, Iran's offensive options are not attractive: because large scale attacks like those attempted at Basrah and Amarah take too long to prepare, they give Iraq the necessary time to detect and prepare defenses. The most likely course of events in the near term, therefore, is for the resumption of a low level protracted border war and Iran's continuing effort to wear down Iraq's morale, aggravate its economic situation and eventually unseat Saddam Husayn. [ ]

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In the meantime, Iraq's economic situation continues to worsen. Its need for Persian Gulf financial assistance is increasing at the same time that those oil producing states are less willing and able to provide Iraq aid on the scale of the previous two years. [ ]

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The status of the negotiation option remains unclear. Khomeini has not enunciated his support for engaging in negotiations and, therefore, no decision to pursue a negotiated settlement has been made in Tehran. [ ]

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A newly emerging element in the war equation is the evidence of waning support for the war effort among the Iranian populace. For the first time, revolutionary guards are being conscripted, desertions are up

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(both of revolutionary guards and regular military) and the regime has executed revolutionary guard commanders. This situation bears careful watching.

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2. Syria-Israel: Update on SA-5 Situation. The Soviet military buildup in Syria continues.

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Additional new equipment is also in Syria:

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Community analysts continue to believe the Soviet actions have not altered the military balance. Some agencies (DIA) believe Israel's air superiority may be eroded, however, if current trends continue. All agree the situation merits close watching. There continues to be no community consensus on whether the Soviets will gain de facto control over the entire Syrian air defense system, but increasing agreement that the new systems will remain under Soviet control for the foreseeable future. [ ]

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We interpret the frequent Soviet warnings of an imminent Israeli attack as an effort to keep regional tensions high to undermine the peace negotiations and increase Syrian dependence on Moscow. It is unlikely that the Soviets are seeking to spark renewed large-scale clashes in Lebanon given Syria's continued military vulnerabilities. Analysts remain concerned [ ] that Syria may launch an offensive in Lebanon in the spring -- a possibility that bears watching. [ ]

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3. Libya-Sudan-Egypt: Implications of Failed Coup Plot Against Sudan. The failure of Tripoli's latest plot to oust Sudanese President Nimeiri probably will make Libyan leader Qadhafi cautious for a time. Over the long term, however, he will continue his pursuit of the goal of bringing the nations of Subsaharan Africa into an Arab-Islamic sphere of influence. Qadhafi will see the US and particularly men like Nimeiri and Egyptian President Mubarak -- whose Arab credentials are suspect in his eyes -- as enemies of this goal. Stepped up efforts to subvert Chad are also likely. [ ]

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4. Pakistan. The riot-affected areas of Karachi returned to quiet after Friday's prayers, traditionally an opportunity for demonstrations. [ ] the authorities appear to have the situation under control, although Sunni leaders have pledged to continue their anti-

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
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Shia agitation. The riots were sparked by municipal authorities' approval of the construction of a Shia community center in a heavily Sunni area of Karachi. The Iranian Consul General (since deported) and resident Iranian students have been implicated in fomenting the incidents. President Zia probably will not be in serious trouble unless further disturbances occur, spread to Lahore (of which there are no indications thus far), and involve other anti-regime groups (e.g. students, lawyers, etc.).

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US personnel and installations do not now appear to be in any special danger -- the violence was 7 to 8 miles from the US consulate. Local authorities, nevertheless, have increased their protection of US facilities.

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TCS 2266-83

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - February 1983

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